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This study investigates the determinants of transfer of waste between the affected areas 
and other municipalities that resulted from the Great East Japan Earthquake. In 
particular, we investigate to what extent economic factors, but also social factors such 
as reciprocity and pro-social concerns, affect municipalities’ decision to accept disaster 
waste. We find some evidence that economic factors affect the decision, but the main 
factors that explain the decision are related to concerns about radiation and social 
concerns about the affected area. Our results suggest that it is primarily social concerns, 
both about the own municipality but also about the affected municipalities that explain 
behavior.  
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On March 11, 2011, the Great East Japan Earthquake that occurred off the Pacific 
coast of Japan triggered a massive tsunami. It heavily impacted areas in the three 
prefectures of Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima, resulted in 15,884 fatalities and 2,633 
missing persons. The tsunami destroyed many houses and buildings and a huge amount 
of disaster waste was generated. The tsunami also damaged the Fukushima Daiichi 
nuclear power plant, leading to a release of radioactive isotopes, and in turn to 
radioactive waste.  
The amounts of waste generated by the tsunami were much larger than that of the 
annual municipal solid waste in these prefectures. Therefore, the Japanese Ministry of 
Environment inquired municipalities about the possibility of accepting the disaster 
waste from the Iwate and Miyagi prefectures. The disaster waste generated in 
Fukushima Prefecture was not included in the wide area treatment because of the 
radiation risk. When municipalities were asked about the possibility of acceptance just 
after the earthquake, 572 municipalities out of 1596 stated that they could accept 
disaster waste. Later on, as we will discuss, only 76 municipalities actually accepted 
disaster waste.  
The tragic event of the tsunami provides us with an interesting case of movement of 
waste between regions/municipalities. There is an empirical literature that has 
investigated the determinants of the transfer of waste between states and countries. For 
example, Levinson (1999a, 1999b) investigated the influence of a waste disposal tax on 
the movement of hazardous waste between states in the United States. It was found that 
factors such as population size and density, land area, and capacity of the disposal site 
had a positive impact on the amount of wide area treatment while factors such as the 
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distance between states, and income had a negative impact. Baggs (2009) studied the 
international transfer of hazardous waste using data collected through the 
implementation of the Basel Convention. The results suggest that the movement of 
waste is better explained by the differences in capital per worker than by differences in 
income per capita. It means that more capital-intensive nations import more hazardous 
waste for disposal.  
The focus of the previous studies has mainly been on the impact of economic factors. 
While they might be also of importance for disaster waste, it is likely that social factors 
such as pro-social and anti-social behavior, and reciprocity could play important roles in 
the time of crisis. Studies in psychology suggest that disasters can invoke both 
pro-social and anti-social behavior among individuals; see e.g. Gantt and Gantt (2012). 
Using economic experiments, Becchetti et al. (2012) find that there are long-run 
negative effects on altruism of being a victim of a natural disaster such as a Tsunami, 
while Li et al. (2013) find heterogeneous effects depending on the age of the victim. 
There is also an extensive literature on attitudes towards infrastructure development – 
such as landfills – that suggest that factors such as fear of objective and subjective risks 
are in important in determining local residents attitudes towards these types of projects 
(see e.g. Gallagher et al., 2008; Jenkins et al., 2004; Lober and Green, 1994; 
McClelland et al., 1990). Residents opposition to new development – that is collectively 
desirable - has given rise to the term NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard). As discussed by 
Frey et al. (1996), monetary compensation does not in many cases increase the level of 
support. On the contrary compensation could crowd-out intrinsic motivation (Frey and 
Oberholzer-Gee 1997; Titmus, 1970). This also suggests that intrinsic pro-social factors 
could be important for the attitudes towards these types of projects. There are actually 
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examples of counter-movements; often using the term YIMBY (Yes In My Backyard), 
that has more positive attitudes towards changes in the built environment.    
In this paper, we investigate the characteristics of the municipalities that responded to 
the request for accepting the disaster waste of the Great East Japan Earthquake. In 
particular, we focus on the role of social factors such as altruistic reasons, measured as 
the amount of donations to the disaster victims, and reciprocity, i.e. if accepting 
municipalities themselves face the risks of similar situation. 
The next section contains a description of the situation and the request for treatment 
of disaster waste. Section 3 introduces the data and the empirical strategy. Results are 
presented in Section 4 and Section 5 presents the conclusion. 
 
2. Background 
On March 11, 2011, the Great East Japan Earthquake that occurred off the Pacific 
coast of Japan triggered a massive tsunami. The most heavily impacted areas were in 
the three prefectures of Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima. The tsunami destroyed many 
houses and buildings and generated a huge amount of disaster waste. The amount of the 
disaster waste in Iwate prefecture was about 5.25 million tons, in Miyagi prefecture was 
11.54 million tons, and in the Fukushima prefecture was 2 million tons. These are 
approximately 12 times, 14 times, and 3 times larger than that of the annual municipal 
solid waste in these prefectures, respectively. Iwate and Miyagi prefectures requested 
other municipalities to accept wide area treatment of the disaster waste through the 
Japanese Ministry of Environment. The disaster waste generated in Fukushima 
Prefecture has not been included in the wide area treatment so far because of the risk of 
radiation. 
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The Ministry of Environment inquired municipalities about the possibility of 
accepting the disaster waste in April 2011. As a result, 42 prefectures and 572 
municipalities expressed intentions of accepting the disaster waste. The aggregate 
capacity of the incinerators in these municipalities amounted to about 2.93 million tons 
per year, suggesting that the wide area treatment could help a prompt response for 
disaster recovery. However, when the Ministry of Environment investigated the 
intentions again in October 2011, there were only 54 municipalities that had already 
accepted, or began actions towards acceptance. Compared to the investigation results of 
April 2011, it is clear that negative attitudes among the municipalities had increased. 
The main reason was the anxiety over the possibility of radioactive contamination of 
the waste. In June 2011, it was detected that the radiation level in the incineration ashes 
of the municipal solid waste in Edogawa Ward, Tokyo was higher than the standard 
level.*  Although the high radiation level found in the incineration waste of the 
Edogawa Ward does not relate to the wide area treatment, it invoked an anxiety over the 
radiation risks. The incident damaged the confidence of the government and created 
suspicion that sufficient information was not provided.  
We use cross-sectional data from 1,592 municipalities that does not include the 
municipalities of Miyagi, Iwate, and Fukushima prefectures. The data on the acceptance 
of disaster waste is based on the reports from the municipalities, collected by the 
Ministry of the Environment as of June 26, 2012 and October 25, 2013. Table 1 shows 
the number of municipalities from 2011 to 2013 that were either positive or negative 
toward accepting the waste. For 2011, we only have information about the total number 
                                                   
*According to the guidelines of the Ministry of the Environment, radiation levels of the combustible 
waste must be less than 240Bq/kg for incineration and that of the incombustible waste must be less than 
8,000Bq/kg for final disposal.  
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of municipalities that were positive, but not which these municipalities are.  
On June 29, 2012, The Ministry of the Environment informed that there were enough 
expressed intentions of acceptance from municipalities to treat the existing tsunami 
waste and there was no need to examine further interest from other municipalities. As of 
June 2013, 76 municipalities have accepted the tsunami waste. Most of these 
municipalities are in the eastern part of Japan. Figure 1 shows the rate of municipalities 
that accepted the tsunami waste in each prefecture as of October 25, 2013.  
The 2012 report by the Ministry of the Environment contains the list of 
municipalities that have been examining the possibility of acceptance, that expressed 
the intention of acceptance, or that have already accepted the disaster waste. We treat 
these municipalities as positive towards acceptance. The 2013 report contains a list of 
municipalities that have already accepted the disaster waste. Since the Ministry of the 
Environment sent a message on June 29, 2012 that there was no need to examine further 
acceptance, there are no municipalities examining the possibility of the acceptance or 
expressing any intention of acceptance in the 2013 report. 
The role of the Ministry of the Environment in the wide area treatment of the tsunami 
waste was to coordinate the stakeholders. The Ministry facilitated the cooperation 
between the affected municipality and the accepting municipality and requests the 
acceptance of disaster waste for prefectures. The role of the prefecture was to 
investigate municipalities belonging to the prefecture about acceptance. Some 
prefectures that have their own incineration facilities or waste disposal, have accepted 
disaster waste. One example of this is Tokyo, which accepted about 25,000 tons of 
tsunami waste from several municipalities. 
The role of the municipality is to accept the disaster waste and incinerate or dispose 
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of it in their facility for treatment of municipal solid waste. In addition, the accepting 
municipality measures the radiation level of the waste and announces the results to 
alleviate any anxiety the inhabitants may have. An affected municipality can receive a 
subsidy from the Ministry of the Environment to cover the entire cost of implementing 
the wide area treatment. Thus, in principle, the affected or accepting municipality does 
not need to bear any of the cost of disaster waste disposal. 
The practice of wide area treatment is as follows. Table 2 describes the steps of the 
wide area treatment for the case of Osaka city, which accepted 15,000 tons of 
combustible disaster waste from the Miyako area in Iwate prefecture. The required 
disposal cost was at least 290 million yen. The tsunami waste contains many materials 
such as mud, concrete, plants, houses, cars, and various products. At the first temporary 
site in the Miyako area, the disaster waste was separated into combustibles and 
incombustibles, hazardous and non-hazardous, and recyclable and non-recyclable (by 
hand or machine). The separated waste was sent to a second temporary site and further 
separated by hand. After the separation process, the radiation level of the waste was 
measured at the second temporary site. The radiation level was measured again before 
loading it onto ships and trucks for transportation. 
When the disaster waste arrived at a harbor and a transshipment facility near the 
accepting municipality, the radiation level was measured again. In the transshipment 
facility, machines removed hazardous waste and incombustibles found in the disaster 
waste. Lastly, the disaster waste was treated in an incineration plant and sent to a final 
disposal site, where it was disposed together with municipal solid waste after the 
measurement of concentration of radioactive material.  
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3. Data and empirical strategy 
3.1 Factors affecting the acceptance of waste 
As discussed in the introduction section, there is evidence that factors such as 
socio-economic and geographic characteristics of the municipalities and prefectures can 
affect the likelihood of accepting the disaster waste (see e.g. Levinson 1999a, 1999b). 
To begin with, we therefore include information on the population density, the rate of 
agricultural workers, and the population share under age 15 as explanatory variables. 
We include these four variables primarily to control for the importance of anxiety over 
the radioactive contamination. Reluctance to accept the waste may be stronger in 
municipalities with a higher population density since it is more likely that people live 
closer to the facility in a densely populated area. In municipalities with a large share of 
children, there may be stronger anxiety by parents over the health effects of radiation on 
their children. Similarly, in the municipalities with a higher number of agricultural 
workers, there may be more inhabitants who feel anxiety over the impact of radioactive 
material on the production of agricultural products.  
 The main economic factor that we will include is the slack capacity of the 
incinerator plants. The idea is that municipalities will try to manage their incinerators 
efficiently from the viewpoint of economic rationality. If there is a larger slack capacity 
in incinerators, they can bring the operation of the facility to a more efficient level by 
accepting additional waste from other municipalities. Data on the slack capacity of 
incineration plants and the slack capacity of final disposal sites in each prefecture were 
available from a survey by the Ministry of the Environment. The slack capacity of 
incineration plants is calculated as the difference between the annual capacity of the 
facility and the annual throughput. 
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We also investigate the effects of the pre-existing implementation of wide area 
treatment of municipal solid waste. While each municipality has responsibility to the 
treatment of its household waste in Japanese waste management policy, the Ministry of 
the Environment has, since late 1990s, promoted wide area treatment because of scale 
economy. Many municipalities form a coalition to treat household waste and share the 
incineration plants and final disposal sites that are operated based on the cooperation 
among municipalities. A municipality that is used to accepting the solid waste of other 
municipalities might have less reluctance to the wide area treatment of disaster waste. 
Although each municipality determined the acceptance of the disaster waste 
independently, there might be an influence by the prefecture that the municipality 
belongs to. For example, the municipality can receive cooperation and support on the 
wide area treatment from the prefecture if the prefecture is also in favor of acceptance. 
We therefore include information on whether or not the prefecture was in favor of 
acceptance of the waste.  
Reciprocity reasons could also be important for why a municipality accepts the 
disaster waste. Municipalities may willing to accept the disaster waste because they 
could be harmed by a disaster in the future, and thereby are able to ask other 
municipalities for help as well. Specifically, this motive would be strong if the 
municipality is located near the nuclear power plant as the risk of being denied the 
request is higher. Data on the location of nuclear power plants was sourced from the 
Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc. This is a dummy variable that takes the value one 
if there is any nuclear power plant within the boundaries of the municipality. As of 
March 2, 2011, there were 54 nuclear power reactors located in 17 municipalities in 13 
prefectures in Japan.  
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Finally, cooperation for emergency restoration between municipalities might be 
implemented from a humanitarian point of view. Then, the related question is if there 
are differences in the extent of pro-sociality among municipalities in general, and in 
particular with respect to altruistic concerns regarding the actual disaster in question. 
Furthermore, these potential differences might affect the likelihood of acceptance. In 
order to investigate this, we include two measures relating to the extent of pro-sociality 
among the municipalities and prefectures. The first one is a measure of the extent of 
volunteer activity in each prefecture. The data comes from the 2011 survey on Time 
Use and Leisure Activities by the Statistical Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Communications. The data measures the percentage of people above 10 
years old who participated in any volunteer activity in that year. Since the October 2011 
survey was conducted after the disaster in March 2011, it also contains the volunteer 
activity for the Great East Japan Earthquake. The second measure is the amount of 
donations from the inhabitants of the prefecture to the victims of the Great East Japan 
Earthquake. The Japanese Red Cross Society, one of the biggest organizations that 
collected donations for victims of the Great East Japan Earthquake, provides data on the 
donations from each prefecture in Japan from March 2011 to March 2012. The data 
does not contain the money that was sent directly to the head office of the Japanese Red 
Cross Society. Thus, if the ratio between the donations to the prefectural office and 
those to the head office is significantly different among prefectures, it does not 
accurately represent the exact donations from each prefecture. While both our measures 
of pro-social preferences could explain the willingness to help the affected 
municipalities with handling their waste, the second measure is directly related to the 
disaster itself. 
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The relationship between donations and acceptance of waste is not clear. On the one 
hand the size of the donations could be a good measure of the extent of altruistic 
concerns. On the other hand, psychological studies suggest that there could be some sort 
of moral licensing (Monin and Miller, 2001), i.e. people who have undertaken a 
praiseworthy act, receive an implicit license for subsequently conducting a more selfish 
act. For example, Mazar and Zhong (2010) found that people become less altruistic after 
purchasing environmentally friendly products than after purchasing conventional 
products. In the case of the Great East Japan Earthquake, donations to help the victims 
might have lead to moral licensing.  
The final variable that we include that is related to social concerns is the distance 
from Fukushima Daiichi. Social concern or social distance is potentially a function of 
spatial proximity (Akerlof 1997, Gleaser et al., 2002). Thus it is possible that people 
that live in municipalities close to the affected area have a closer social connection with 
the people in these areas, and are thus more concerned and more likely to support any 
help to the affected areas.    
Summary statistics of all the variables are presented in Table 3. 
 
3.2 Model 
We estimate the determinants for the municipalities’ acceptance of disaster waste 
using the logit model. The model is: 
 
Prob ! = 1|! = Λ !!! = !!!!1+ !!!! 
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where Y is a dummy variable that takes the value of one when the municipality is 
positive toward the acceptance of the disaster waste and x represents explanatory 
variables. We estimate two models: one based on the 2012 data and one based on the 
2013 data. Regarding the 2012 data, three kinds of municipalities are treated as positive 
toward the acceptance: municipalities that have been examining the possibility of 
acceptance; municipalities that have expressed the intention to acceptance; and those 
that have already accepted the disaster waste. With regard to estimations using the data 
of 2013, municipalities positive toward the acceptance are those have already accepted 
the disaster waste. 
There are large differences in the acceptance rate between the regions, in particular 
between eastern and western parts of Japan. In particular, there are very few 
municipalities that finally accepted waste in 2013 in western Japan. We will therefore 
also estimate models focusing only on eastern part of Japan.  
When a municipality already disposes municipal solid waste by wide area treatment 
with neighboring municipalities, it is necessary for the municipality to obtain 
permission from other municipalities to accept disaster waste. Hence, all of these 
municipalities belonging to the group of wide area treatment are counted as accepting 
municipalities because they actually agreed upon acceptance.  
 
4. Results 
Table 4 reports the results from the binary logit models with the acceptance of waste 
as the dependent variable. The first two models report the results from the 2012 and 
2013 data respectively, and include all municipalities. The third and fourth model 
reports results focusing only on the municipalities in eastern Japan.  
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Most of the estimated marginal effects have signs that are in line with our hypotheses. 
The statistical significance varies somewhat between the 2012 and 2013 data. In 
municipalities with higher amount of donations, the likelihood of accepting waste is 
higher, and the effect is statistically significant in all models except the 2012 data of the 
full sample. The sizes of the marginal effects are non-negligible although not huge. For 
example, for the 2013 model if donations increase by one standard deviation, the 
probability that a municipality accepts waste increases by almost 0.02 units. The 
measure of volunteer activity is also positively correlated with the likelihood of 
accepting waste for all models at least in 10% level. In particular if we focus on the 
sample of municipalities in eastern Japan, the effect is robust. Thus, both our measures 
of pro-sociality are positively related to acceptance, and since the amount of donations 
is positively related, any type of moral licensing is not so strong so that it counteracts 
the effect of pro-sociality on the acceptance of waste. 
The results related to the distance to the Fukushima Daiichi also point to the fact that 
social concerns were important when deciding whether to accept the waste or not. The 
estimated marginal effects with the data from all of Japan show that the distance from 
the Fukushima Daiichi is negative and statistically significant. This suggests that there 
is a stronger concern about the affected areas and a stronger willingness to help in 
municipalities that are close to the affected area. The size of the marginal effect is 
sizeable, for the 2013 model an increase in distance corresponding to a standard 
deviation increase, decrease the probability of acceptance by 0.061 units. On the other 
hand, the marginal effect is insignificant in estimation with the data of eastern Japan.  
Results related to the factor of reciprocity show that proximity to a nuclear power 
plant has statistically significant and positive marginal effect. A municipality that has a 
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nuclear power plant within its boundaries may accept the disaster waste because they 
would expect other municipalities to help if a severe nuclear accident occurred in their 
own municipality. The results suggest that the concept of reciprocity motivation leads to 
a municipality’s acceptance. 
The impact of the prefecture’s intention is negative and statistically significant in 
models that use the data from 2012. On the other hand, the effect is positive and 
statistically significant in models that use the data from 2013. Since the 2012 data 
contains municipalities that show intentions of accepting disaster waste and the 2013 
data does not, this suggests that the intentions of the prefecture tend to be positive when 
the municipalities move to the actual stage of acceptance. While the negative coefficient 
in models with the data from 2012 is difficult to interpret, the influence of different 
levels of government might not be weak in coordinating the inter-municipal transfer of 
disaster waste. 
While the above variables are mostly related to non-economic motivations for 
acceptance, the estimated results suggest that economic incentives to some extent 
influence the decision to accept disaster waste, at least in some cases. If we look at all 
municipalities in 2012, then the slack capacity of the incineration plant is positively 
correlated with the decision to accept waste or not. However, if we only look at the 
municipalities in eastern Japan, this is no longer true. Thus, the municipalities in eastern 
Japan may tend to accept the waste regardless of economic rationality.  
The ratio of the population working in the agricultural sector as well as population 
density is statistically significant and negative. The agricultural workers might fear that 
accepting the tsunami waste could create a negative image of their products. Results on 
the variable suggest that the reluctance to accept disaster waste is strong in the 
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municipalities with a higher number of workers in agricultural sector. On the other hand, 
evidence is weak for the effect of population density and those under 15 years of age. 
While the sign of coefficients are in line with expectation, it does not have a strong 
statistically significant impact on the municipalities’ decision to accept disaster waste. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This study investigated the determinants for the municipalities’ acceptance of disaster 
waste resulting from the Great East Japan Earthquake. Our results indicate the social 
preferences were important for the decision to accept waste, more so than economic 
reasons. Previous studies have focused on economic reasons for transfer of waste 
between regions or municipalities. Thus, what we show is that other reasons could 
explain the decision as well.   
Many news articles reported that inhabitants protested or opposed the acceptance of 
disaster waste while hoping for the revival of the stricken area. Our results confirm that 
the opposition to some extent comes from the inhabitants’ anxiety over radiation 
contamination from the disaster. Information disclosure and communication about the 
radiation risks are important, especially for municipalities that are located far from the 
damaged area. The finding pertains to many NIMBY problem and the wide area 
treatment of other hazardous waste. On the other hand, variables related to pro-sociality 
positively affect the municipalities’ acceptance of disaster waste. We could not find any 
evidence of moral licensing or negative relation between pro-social behaviors. 
Understanding how pro-social behaviors can positively affect cooperation is important 
for policy interventions for disaster recovery. It can create a feeling of YIMBY, i.e. Yes 
in my Backyard. It can be helpful for the ministry in the central government when it 
 17 
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Table 1: The number of municipalities and acceptance 
 
 2011  2012  2013 
   Total  West East Total  West East Total 
Positive  572  25 166 191  2 74 76 
Negative  1030  678 723 1401  703 815 1516 
Total  1596  703 889 1592  705 889 1592 
Note: The number of municipalities changes over the years due to municipal mergers. As for the data in 






Table 2: The flow of the wide area treatment 
Miyako area  
1. Separation by machine and hand Fist temporary site 
2. Separation by hand Second temporary site 
3. Measurement of the radiation level  
4. Measurement of the radiation level Harbor in Iwate 
5. Loaded onto a ship  
Osaka city  
6. Unloading of containers Harbor in Osaka 
7. Measurement of the radiation level  
8. Separation by machine Transshipment facility 
9. Measurement of the radiation level  
10. Incineration with municipal solid waste  Incineration plant 
11. Measurement of the radiation level  
12. Final disposal with municipal solid waste  Final disposal site 







Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
  Average Min. Max. SD 
Donation (yen/person) 0.81 0.14 2.69 0.52 
Volunteer (%) 3.31 2.00 6.90 1.05 
Proximity of nuclear plant (dummy) 0.01 0.00 1.00 0.10 
Prefecture intention (dummy) 0.40 0.00 1.00 0.49 
Slack capacity of incineration plant (10000 t/per year) 3.14 -0.21 120 5.91 
Slack capacity of final disposal site (10000 t) 2.64 0.00 430 18.33 
Distance from Fukushima Daiichi (100 km) 5.91 0.73 22.38 3.63 
Population under age 15 (%) 12.70 4.25 21.81 2.28 
Agricultural workers (%) 5.33 0 59.36 5.79 
Density (100 person/km2) 2.04 0.00 50.07 5.43 
Wide area treatment of municipal solid waste (dummy) 0.58 0.00 1.00 0.49 








All of Japan East Japan 
2012 Data 2013 Data 2012 Data 2013 Data 
Donations 0.015  0.039 *** 0.106 *** 0.067 *** 
 
(0.015)  (0.008)  (0.022)  (0.014)  
Volunteers  0.040 *** 0.008 * 0.070 *** 0.020 ** 
 
(0.008)  (0.005)  (0.011)  (0.009)  
Proximity of nuclear plant 0.138 *** 0.133 *** 0.207 *** 0.218 *** 
 
(0.050)  (0.025)  (0.066)  (0.045)  
Prefecture intentions -0.076 *** 0.069 *** -0.063 ** 0.127 *** 
 
(0.018)  (0.016)  (0.025)  (0.029)  
Slack capacity of incineration plant 0.004 *** 0.000  0.002  0.001  
 
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  
Slack capacity of final disposal site 0.000  0.001 *** 0.001 * 0.001  
 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Distance from Fukushima nuclear plant -0.014 *** -0.017 *** 0.009  -0.013  
 
(0.004)  (0.005)  (0.010)  (0.011)  
Population under age 15 (*102) 0.673 * 0.090  0.931  0.201  
 
(0.381)  (0.265)  (0.567)  (0.463)  
Agricultural workers  -0.012 *** -0.004 ** -0.018 *** -0.006 ** 
 
(0.003)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.003)  
Density -0.002  -0.004 * -0.000  -0.000 * 
 
(0.002)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Wide area treatment of municipal solid 
waste  
0.009  0.016  0.032  0.025  
(0.016)  (0.010)  (0.025)  (0.019)  
Observations 1592  1592  889  889  





Figure 1: The acceptance rate as of October 25, 2013 
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